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countries. Demirgilg-Kunt  and Levine  idctify  two  sector reform and the initial state of the financial  system.
distinct but complementary  approach-es  to pub)lic  They  reach three broad, tentative conclusions:
enterprise reform: the private sector development  *  Public enterprise reform is more successfu!  in
approach and the corporatization  approach.  countries  whose financial  systems  are relatively  well
The private sector development  approach involves  developed  and less  successful  in countries  with relatively
privatizing  public  enterprises  and encouraging private  underdeveloped  financial  systems.
sector development  to improve economic  efficicy.  -- and  *  Countries  will be more successful  in implementing
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A. Summary
Public enterprise reform is an important component of policy strategies to accelerate
economic growth in many countries.  Public enterprise (PE) reform consists of two distinct,
but complementary, approaches.  The private sector development approach to PE reform
involves prinvatig  PEs and encouraging private sector development to both onhance
economic efficiency and shrink the relative size of the PE sector.  The corporatization
approach involves enhancing managenal incentives and clarifying PE budget constraints, so
that PE performance improves without the government relinquishing ownership.
This paper studies the relationship between the financial system and the success of
PE reforms.  We first develop a conceptual framework that describes the role of three
financial services  - mobilizing  resources,  evaluating  firms,  and  monitoring  managers  - in
promoting both the private sector development and the corporatization approaches to PE
reform.  We then use nine country case studies - Chile, Egypt, Ghana, India, Korea,
Mexico, the Philippines, Senegal, and Turkey - to study the linkages between PE reform
and both the initial state of the financial system and financial sector reform.
Our analysis yields three broad, tentative conclusions:
(1)  Countrs  w  initially relatively well-dveloped  financial systems enjoy
comparatively more successful PE reforms  than counries  witkh  comparatvely
underdeveloped financirn  sjwtenw.  While an initiaUly  well-developed financial
system is neither necessry  nor sufficient for successful PE reform, well-developed
capital markets substantially expand the set of feasible privatization options available2
to the government, and well-fiunctioning  financial intermediaries enhance
competition, improve resource allocation, and lower adjustment costs.  Thus, market-
oriented financial services bolster both the private sector development and
corporatization approaches to PE reform.
(2)  Countries seeking so implemented large-scale PE reforms achekve greater success
ifthey  also implement substantial and well-designed  fmnancial sector reforms.  In
many countries, a dual economic system exists, where public banks primarily serve
PEs based on public-policy criteria and private financial intermediaries primarily
serve prvate  firms based on market criteria.  Thus, to be successful, PE reform
involving greater reliance on market-principles will, in almost all cases, require
comprehensive fmancial sector reforms so that the financial system can provide
market-based financial services.
There are two noteworthy corollaries to this hypothesis.  First, in the presence
of a relatively well-developed financial system, moderate-scale public enterprise
reform can succeed without substantial financial sector reforms.  Second, poorly
designed financial sector reforms can hurt public enterprise reform.
(3)  Successful financial  sector reform involves three components that are generally
implemented in the following  order: financial  infrastructure building,
liberalization, and private financial  intermediary expansion.  Failure in  any
component severely jeopardizes the chance thatfnancial  reform will support PE
reform  Counties  with large PEs often have financial systems that do not and
cannot provide market-onented financial services.  Thus, financial reforms will3
typically be needed to create a financial system that can support PE reform.
Financial infastructure  building involves improving the regulatory system,
supervisory capacity, legal codes, and enforcement capabilities.  Infrastructure
improvement should facilitate financial contracting and improve the chances that
private fimancial  intermediaries  will operate and compete prudently.  Financial
liberalization involves reducing interest rate controls, directed credit programs,
taxation, and government oversight.  Liberalization is designed to stimulate
competition for savings, better resource allocation, and enhanced corporate
governace.  Finally, to support PE reforms, financial sector reforms should promote
private financial intermediary development by removing impediments to private
intermediary expansion, downsizing public banks, and privatizing some public banks.
An important corollary to this hypothesis involves the sequencing of PE
reform and financial sector reform.  Our analysis suggests that some financial sector
reforms should proceed, others accompany, and still other reforms follow PE refornm
Specifically, policy makers should begin financial liberalizafion and financial
infratructure  building prior to PE privatization because financial reform is a long-
run process and needs to be initiated early to create a solid foundation for PE reform
and further financial reforms.  During PE privatization, authorities should continue
liberaliing  and building a market-oriented financial infrastructure and also remove
impediments to private financial intermediary development.  Finally, governments
should initiate the process of privatizing some state-owned banks along with and
soon after PE privatization.4
B.  Oualifications and Cautions
These conclusions represent our best judgements after fornulating  a conceptual
framework and reviewing nine country experiences.  Here we qualify' our findings and list a
few reasons for being less than sanguine about our results.
B.].  Caus~ality:  The causal relationship between financial development and PE
refc,rmn  rns  in both directions, and exogenous factor-s  help determine the ultimate success of
both PE and financial reform.  While this paper argues that financial services promote
successful PE reform, we readily acknowledge that public enterprise reforn  can s-timulate
increased demand for and improvements in capital marl -. t and financial intermediary
services.  The two reforms are inseparable.  Indeed, PE refonm  and financial reform tend to
be mutually reinforcing.  This paper, however, focuses on the financial system and financial
reform as inputs into public enterprise reform, and therefore, we do not give equal
tretment  to  the role that public enterprise reform plays in stimulating financia  sector
improvements.
Furthermore, the causes of the ultimate success or failure of PE reform are probably
based more in the political and social commitment to change tha  in the pre-existing state
of the financial systemn. In many countries, technical mcaim  exist to reform PEs and
improve the finacial  systm;  the missing ingredient is political and social commitment.
Nevertheless, by highlighting the linkages between the financial system and PE reforma,  this
paper seeks to ensure that, once the political will for change exists PE reforms do not
ignore financial factors that critically enhance the probability of successful PE reformn.5
11.2 Methodology: Two methodological issues should make reade-s cautious about
this paper's  conclusions.  First, we examine only nine country cases.  Many factors will
influence PE reforms or whether governments even undertake reform.  Macroeconomic
conditions and the policy environment influence economic performance.  Labor markets,
product markets, politics, the trade regime, and the legal system all play important roles in
PE reform.  Thus, the explanatory variables probably outnumiber  the country cases.  Instead
of formal statistical support for our conclusions, we construct a conceptual framework and
then evaluate whether, in general, the cases are consistent with this framework.
A second methodological problem is that we categorize FE reforms and financiti
systems broadly.  We classify PE reform experiences as relatively successful or
unsuccessful even though there are different criteria along to which to judge  enterprise
reform, and countries have different objectives.  Similarly,  economidsts  differ in how to
measure "financial development"  Thus, classifying PE reform and financial systems
involves great subjectivity.  Nonetheless, we assess the comparative levels of financia
development and the relative success of PE reform efforts, so that we can formulate views
on the most important linkages between the financial system and PE reform.
With these qualifications and cautions i numnd,  Section II presents a conceptual
approach to the linkages between PE reform and the financial sector.  After briefly
reviewing the nine country case studies in Section IIl, we evaluate the impact of the initial
state of the financial system on FE reform in Section IV and the links between financial
reform and PE reform in section V.  Section VI presents policy recommendations.6
II.  Concepts
A. Overview and Definitions
This section describes three services - mobilizing savings, allocating capital, and
monitoring managers - that are crucial determinants of enterprise efficiency and economic
growth.'  In many countries, the financial system plays an important role in mobilizing and
allocating capital, and in overseeing managers.  Consequently, analysts frequently call these
three services "financial services" or "functions of the financial system."  We follow this
custom.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that governments and institutions not
always labelled "financial institutions" sometimes provide these services, especially to
public enterprises and in economies dominated by publicly owned enterprises.
To construct a conceptual framework of the role of the financial system in PE
reform, we first describe the role of the financial system in a hypothetical economy where
the government plays very little role in mobilizing resources, selecting firms, providing
corporate governance, or operating enterprises.  In this type of environment, private
fimancial  institutions provide financial services to private enterprises.  We then consider a
country that chooses to have a large public enterprise sector.  Countries that create public
enterprises will also create institutions to finance PEs.  Public banks are one popular vehicle
for doing this.  This perspective implies a dual economic system, where public banks
primarily serve public enterprises based on public-policy criteria and private financial
intermediaries primarily serve private firms based on market criteria.
Sce Caprio, ct. al (1994)  and King  and Levine (1993a, 1993b).7
We focus on two types of PE reform.  The first type of reform, "PE reform with
greater PE autonomy," involves reducing the role of government and state-controlled banks
in mobilizing rcsources for enterprises and monitoring managers.  Here, we focus on
privatization; but we also discuss PE corporatization where PEs are treated more like
private firms.  The second type of PE reform tlht we consider consists of tiglter
govermnent oversight of the PE.  Here, the governmcnt monitors PE managers more
rigorously and tightly imposes a budget constraint on PEs to improve performance.
We argue that PE reform involving greater PE autonomy will have a much better
chance of increasing economic efficiency in the presence of an initially well-functioning,
non-state dominated financial system.  Privatization or PE corporatization with greaLcr
autonomy implies an increased reliance on market-based financial services.  Since
governments create state-controlled banks partly to serve PEs, state banks are generally less
effective at providing market-based financial services than private financial intermediaries.
Thus, PE reform involving greater PE autonomy will tend be more successful if undertaken
in the presence of an initially well-developed private fmancial system.
Moreover, this conceptual framework also implies that PE reform is inextricably
linked to financial reform.  To the extent that the publicly-owned financial system has been
established to serve PEs, reforming the PE sector will require different arrangements and
institutions to provide essential financial services to reforming enterprises.  To be
successful, financial sector reforms should include (1) interest rate, tax, and directed credit
liberalization so that emerging institutions can effectively mobilize savings, allocate capital,
and oversee managers, (2) enhanced supervision and regulation to ensure a safe andcompetitive  private financial  systm,  and (3) rapid downsizing  of public banks that serve
PEs, typically  including  some  public bank privatization. While public banks maybe  able to
serve private firms, the different  incentives  typically  fac-ed  by private  banks suggests  that
private intermediaries  will more eff-ectively  promote  PB privatization  than public banks.
Accordingly,  our conceptual  fr-amework  suggests  that PB reform  must be coordinated
with fi'nancial  reform to be successful:  large-scale  PB privatization  requires  large-scale
financial  sector  reforms;  and, slower-paced  or small-scale  PE reform can succeed  with more
modest and moderately-paced  financial  reforms. Furthermore,  well-functioning  stock
exchanges  and financial  institutions  broaden  the set of reform strategies  available  to policy
makers  by facilitating  the ability of the government  to privatize  PEs.  Thus,  the functioning
of the financial  sector may importantly  influence  the PE reform strategy  and the ultimate
success of PE reform. 2
Although  PE reform involving  tighter  government  oversight  of PEs will rely less on
the financial  system  tha  PB reform involving  greater PE autonomy,  the financial  system
may also indirectly  promote  PE reformn  based on tighter government  oversight.
Specifically,  a well-functioning  financial  system  boosts  private sector  development. Private
sector  development  in turn promotes  successful  PE reform  by augmenting  competition  and
market-based  incentives  throughout  the economy  and by strengthening  labor demand,  which
may fall as reforming  PEs shed excess  workers.
If a country  is unable  or unwilling  to liberalize  financial  repression,  upgrade its
funacial infrastructure,  and privatize  existing  public  banks, the country  should  adjust the
2 Although  a strng financial  system  enhances  the probability  of successful  PE reform,  an  under-developed  financial
systmn  should  not  necessarily  delay  PE reform  since finania sectors  can  be rcforned  and  strengthened.9
pace of public entexprise reform.  Indeed, comprehensive reform of both PEs and banks
may reflect the "true" underlying cause of successful PE reform: deep social and political
commitments to changing the incentives and opportunities faced by businesses and
individuals.
B. Financial Services in a Market Economy
To exemplify the importance of finance in PE reform, we first discuss the
importance of three financial services in an economy where the government plays little
direct role.  We call this a "market-oriented" economy.
First, in market-onented economies, the financial system evaluates firms and
allocates resources based on these evaluations.  Financial maket  participants research firms,
managers, sectors, and business trends and choose the most promising and credit-worthy
ventures.  This includes large financial intermediares  such banks, mutual fimds, pension
fumds,  and insurance companies deciding Where to make loans and purchase equity, but this
also includes small venture capital institutions and individual entrepreneurs seeding
profitable investments.  Better financial systems are better at evaluating enterprises and
allocating resources to firms with high expected returns.  The better financial systems are at
obtaining and processing information, the better will be the allocation of capital.
Second, financial systems mobilize capital from disparate savers through banks,
insurance companies, pension funds, investment companies, and capital markets.  This
mobilzation  is critical for economic development  Many worthwhile investments require
large capital inputs and some enjoy economies of scale.  By agglomerating savings from
many individuals, financial intermediaries enlarge the set of projects available to society.10
Furthermore, financial systems that both effectiveny mobilize savings and select promising
firms intensify competition.  Currently dominant frms  will be less protected from
competition if sound financial systems are able to identify and fund competing enterprises.
Finally, financial systems help compel managers to act in the interests of firm claim
holders (stock, bond, and debt holders).  In large private enterprises with disperse claim
holders, enterprise managers may enjoy excessive independence from enterprise managers.
Small equity and bond holders may be unable or unwilling to obtain information, process
that information, and effectively oversee the management of large, complex corporations.
Managers, therefore, may funnel enterprise resources to themselves or make decisions based
on personal as opposed to corporate criteria  The financial system may be able to improve
corporate governance.  Large financial intermediaries, with proper incentives and staff, will
undertake the difficult tasks of monitoring managers and obliging them to act more in the
interests of firm claim holders than a disparate group of individual shareholders (none of
whom individually finds it worthwhile to undertake the large monitoring costs).  This
corporate governance will encourage more efficient resource allocation by aligning
managerial incentives with those of creditors.  In addition to improving resource allocation,
good corporate governance encourages investment since investors will feel more confident
that firms will maximize owner profits and service debt obligations.  Thus, in market-
oriented economies, financial systems that ensure that managers act in the best interests of
creditors foster superior resource allocation and more investinnnt.
Sound capital markets can assist intermediaries in exerting corporate governance.  If
capital market participants competently obtain and process information, equity and bondprices will reflect managerial performance and thereby influence managerial behavior.
Also, if capital markets effectively mobilize capital and identify inferior managers, capital
markets offer motivated groups a vehicle for raising capital, acquiring firms, and changing
management.  Therefore, managers may feel more compelled to maximize the value of the
enterprise to claim holders in the presence of well-functioning capital markets.
C. Finance and Public Enterprise Reform
We now describe when and how financial systems affect PE refonn.
C].  Public Enterprises, Public Banks, and Reform:  To start, consider an economy
with a large PE sector.  Further assume that the government exerts a strong hand in
directing credit to favored PEs and has created public banks to facilitate the mobilization of
resources for PEs based on public-policy considerations.  In such an environment, state-
controlled banks generally do not research firms carefully and allocate credit on market-
criteria, nor will state-controlled bpriks necessarily compete aggressively to mobilize
resources, and state-controlled banks will also not exert tight corporate governance to the
same degree or in the same manner that private financial institutions monitor managers of
private firms.  Thus, in an environment where the government has historically guided credit
allocation, the staff of state-controlled financial intermediaries may not be trained in
acquiring and processing information on firms based on market-principles, assessing risk,
attracting customers, and overseeing managers.
This lack of market-oriented financial skills may be complimented by a lack of
financial and legal infstructure.  Pervasive government interference in financial markets12
will tend to reduce reliance on and therefore development of corporate financial reports and
laws concerning collateral, information disclosure, and bankruptcy.  This implies that
countries with large PE sectors may have mechanisms for acquiring information and
enforcing contracts that would not successfully support a large private enterprise sector.
Furthermore, in countries where the govermment  and state-controlled banks play a leading
role in the financial sector, authorities do not have strong incentives to establish sound
prudential rules and supervisory capabilities.  This discussion suggests that countries with
large PE sectors often have financial systems that cannot provide market-based fimancial
services because the large PE sector stymies market-oriented financial development.
From the starting point of a country with a large PE sector and state-controiled
banks, we sow  evaluate the role of the fiancial  system and financial sector reform in
promoting the success of three types of PE reform: privatization, corporatization involving
greater PE autonomy, and corporatization involving tighter govermment  oversight.
CZ.  Privciation:  Privatizing an enterprise typically signifies a much reduced role
for the govenmnent in directing banks to fimd PEs, providing guarantees on PE borrowig,
or compelling banks to fund PEs at low interest rates.  If the financial system is not ready
to provide marke-based  financial services, significant financial reforms will have to be
initiated for privatization to be successful.  These financial reforms should include the
following three components: (1) liberalization of interest rate controls, credit controls, and
government repression of banks to stimulate greater and more effective competition of
savings, better resource allocation, and enhanced corporate governance on market terms, (2)
strengthening of the legal, regulatory and supervisory system:  to ensure that private13
financial intermediaries operate and compete in a prudent fashion, and to facilitate financial
contracting, (3) state-bank downsizing - typically including bank privatization - to increase
the capabilities of the private financial sector.
The financial system also broadens the set of privatization options.  First, well
developed, liquid capital markets will make it easier to privatize PEs through the selling of
equity to a broad group of investors.  Broad distribution may mitigate criticisms that the
government is selling public property cheaply to particular individuals for political or
personal advantage or that the government is giving the country away to foreigners.
Second, banks and other financial intermediaries may improve the privatization process.
Banks that effectively mobilize savings, assess entrepreneurs, finance purchases of PEs and
energetically and competently oversee new management will expand the number of
investors that can participate in the privatization process, help ensure that PEs go to
qualified owners, and compel new owners to act appropriately.  Finally, a well-functioning
financial system reduces the urgency for breaking up large firms pnor  to privatization to
prevent the establishment of entrenched private monopolies.  Specifically, some large PEs
may have market power even tough  they are not natural monopolies.  Under-developed
financial markets make market entry more difficult and therefore may allow pnvatized
enterprises with market power to remain relatively immune to competitive forces.  On the
other hand, a well-developed financial system would help subject even large firms to
competition by strengthening the ability of new firms to bring better goods to market.
The financial system will also play an important role in reducing the adjustment
costs of PE privatization and thereby enhance the political sustainability of PE reform.14
Newly privatized firms that need to be reoriented and re-tooled will adjust and grow faster
if financial markets can quickly allocate capital to promising firms and ensure that these
funds are used well.  Similarly, by efficiently redeploying the assets of bankrupt
enterprises, a sound financial system will reduce adjustment costs.  Furthermore, by
accelerating private sector development, an effective financial system will indirectly
increase labor demand and thereby mitigate concerns about unemployment.  Since
unemployment may be an important obstacle to beginning and maintaining PE reform, the
financial system may pacify political pressures emanating from unemployment by boosting
private sector labor demand and reducing adjustment costs.  Thus, a well functioning
financial system can reduce the severity and duration of any adjustnent  fo.lowing PE
privatization and maximize the private sector response.  Table  I summarizes this discussion
by illustrating the dimensions along which the government and state-banks exert a reduced
role in mobilizing, allocating, and governing privatized enterprises.
C.3. Corporatization with Greater Autonomy:  The role of the financial system in
corporatization can be evaluated along the same spectrum.  Tautologically, corporatization
strtegies  that involve more PE autonomy - defined as the govermment  playing less of a role
in defining and imposing a budget constraint, allocating resources, and monitoring PE
managers - will have a better chance of improving enterprise performance in the presence
of a well-developed financial system.  When corporatization implies that PEs must go to
ffmancial  markets and compete for financing with other public and private frms,  a market-
oriented financial system will oblige these newly corporatized firms to improve efficiency.
For this type of corporatization strategy to succeed, banks must be sufficiently strong and15
independent to reject loan requests from PEs.  Furthermore, banks that believe the
government  implicitly guarantees loans to PEs will funnel credit to PEs instead of more
worthy firms.  If financial systems continue to allocate credit to corporatized firms on non-
market terms,  PE reform will not cultivate efficiency improvements as rapidly.  Similarly,
corporatization that involves less government oversight of management may prove
disastrous  - and certainly unsustainable - unless the financial system can effectively exert
sound corporate govemance.  Put simply, corporatization that involves a reduced
government role in finacing  PEs and overseeing managers will be more successfid in the
presence of a financial system that can provide these services.
CA4 Corporatization with Greater Government Oversight: Corporatization, however,
may not involve expanded PE autonomy.  Corporatization may consist of more rigid
government  control of the PE.  Governments may impose tight budget constraints and
explicitly limit PE access to bank credit in order to harden incentives to improve PE
performance.  Corporatization  that  involves  tighter  control  of PEs  by the  government  will
rely less on an mdependent financial system than corporatization with expanded PE
autonomy or privatization.  Nonetheless, a well-developed financial system may indirectly
promote all categories of PE corporatization by promofing private sector development.
Private sector development, in turn, promotes corporatizafion by intensifying competitive
pressures on PEs, intensifying incentives for PE managers to improve enterprise efficiency
to enhance private sector job opportunities, and lowering overall corporatization adjustment
costs by increasing the private sector demand for labor.16
D. Financial Sector Reform and Sequencing
PE reform and financial reform are both long-run co-dependent reforms, they need
to be coordinated.  For example, large-scale PE privatization should be preceded by,
accompanied by, and followed by financial sector reforms.  Specifically, to initiate financial
sector reforms and to begin laying the foundation for future reforms, policymakers should
begin liberalizing interest rate and directed credit controls, improving the supervisory,
regulatory, and legal systems prior to PE privatization.  During PE privatization, authorities
should continue liberalizing and building a market-oriented financial infrastructure and
policymakers  should remove impediments to private financial intermediary development and
initiate the process of privatizing some state-banks along with or soon after PE
privatization.?  Reforming the financial system is a complex process, however,  involving
the establishment and staffing of a sound supervisory and regulatory system, developing the
legal infitructure  to support a more market-oriented financial system, training personnel in
financial and accounting skills, and changing the incentives facing financial intennediaries
from trying to satisfy political objectives to trying to provide sound financial services.
Banks may need to be privatized, corporafized, or restructured to improve incentives.  Thus,
unless countries are willing to reform their financial systems comprehensively, aggressive
PE reform will have a much smaller chance of succeeding.
3 PE reform also  cres  fancia  reform.  Mcaningful  financial  reform would  bc difficult if the governxmte  uses the
fianial  system to fnd  a huge PE sector.17
III.  Brief Review of Public Enterprise Reforms: Evidence from Nine Country  Cases
We examine the public enterprise reform experences  of nine countries: Korea,
Mexico, Chile, the Philippines, India, Turkey, Egypt, Senegal, and Ghana. 4 Galal (1993)
reviews these cases in detail and finds that Korea, Mexico, and Chile successfully rcformed,
the Philippines enjoyed some success, while the other countries have so far been relatively
unsuccessfil.  This section and Table 3 briefly summarize PE reforms in each country.
A. Korea
Starting in  1980, Korea had three main PE sector reform periods.  Early
privatization efforts accelerated between 1981 and  1983 when four state-owned banks and
two PEs were sold through public offerings.  The govemment's main reform effort took
place in the second period and focused on corporatization rather than privatization.
Corporatization involved tighter control of PEs by the government through strict budget
constraints, explicit limits an access to bank credit  and a rigorous managerial performace
evaluation system.  From 1983 to  1986, the financial performance of PEs improved
substantially and real profits net of government transfers increased by 10 percent, though
profitability deteriorated in later years.  A more recent privatization drive began in  1987
when the government announced that it would privatize 11 PEs.  Although it is difficult to
assess the success of the latest round of privatizations in Korea, analysts consider Korea's
PB reform program to be successfil,  especially in demonstating  the short-term
effectiveness of corporatization?5
4  These countries were selected so that they exhibit  high varance in their PE refom  stegies.
See Economic  Plnning Board (1991)  and Shirley (1989).18
B. Mexico
Mexico had two major PE reform periods.  From 1983 to  1987, reform focused on
privatizing or liquidating small enterprises.  Of the 743 firns  divested during this period,
154 were sold to private sector, while 589 were liquidated or otherwise disincorporated.
The government also initiated some limited corporatization efforts during the first reform
period.  However, the major reform effort came in the second period, from 1989 to  1993,
when authorities privatized larger PEs.  Also during this period, reforms were undertaken to
improve the efficiency of those PEs which remained under state ownership.  The
government tried to increase the autonomy and accountability of management of PEs via
corporatization.  Government supervision of the PEs shifted from a system of ex-ante
controls on operations to ex-post evaluation of performance and results.  Although it is still
early, Mexico's  reform program has improved the budget and increased efficiency.
C. Chile
Chile pursued an aggressive policy of PE reform during the last 20 years.  The
public sector's  role in the economy was vastly expanded under the Allende govermnent
between 1970 and 1973.  During the first reform period of  1974 to  1982, the government
privatized many PEs, though some larger PEs remained under state control.  The
government also implemented serious steps to improve the performance of large PEs
through corporatization.  They  Aiiposed  a hard budget constraint on PEs, encouraged a
reduction in employment, and tremendously increased the efficiency of the enterprises.
The second reform period began in  1985 and focused on privatization.  The
government privatized many of the larger, unsold PEs.  This second period of privatizations19
led to a significant  reduction in the role of the public sector in the economy.  In  1989, PE
value added accounted for 14 percent of GDP, compared to 39 percent in  1973.  The
overall reformn  experience of Chile was successful in general, especially in corporatization
in the first reform period and privatization in the second period.
D. The PhiliRRines
The Philippines never had a very large PE sector.  The PB sector grew in the  1970s
as a result of "statism" policy and the acquisition of failing enterprises in the  1  980s.  The
governiment privatized many PBs since  1986, and in general, analysts consider Philippine
privatization  to have been relatively successful.'
E. Egypt
In Egypt plans to reform PEs date back to the late 1970s; without much real action
until very recently.  Most reform efforts focused on corporatization and have been relatively
unsuccessful.  Recent corporatization efforts intend to give managers of PEs similar
incentives as private managers.  The government indicated plans to insulate PEs from
political interference and impose hard budget constraints.  Recently the government has
been increasingly emphasizing PE privafization.  The privatization program announced in
May  1990 contemplates divestiture of 240 PBs, but there has been little progress.
F. Turkey
Turkey initiated the process of PE reform in  1980 in response to increasing
budgetary pressures.  Until recently, reform focused mainly on corporatization. Despite
initial gains, PB performance has not improved much.  By 1991, the Pe  sector was unable
v  See Word  Bank (1993) 'Project Compltion Report: Philippine - Reform  Program for Governent  Corporations
(oan  2956-PH),t  Report no.  11768,  and Gaial (1993).20
to cover interest payments through its operating surplus.  More recently, the new
government is re-vitalizing reform plans for privatization.
0.  India
India's  PEs occupy a central position in the ecouiomy. Although the need to reform
PEs has been recognized since the early 1980s, not much real action has been taken till
very recently.  In  1991 India reduced the number of sectors reserved to the state and
announced plans to concentrate future PE development in "strategic" high-technology or
essential infrastructure activities.  The reform strategy included restructuring or closing all
loss-making PEs, gradual disinvestment of the government's shares of selected PEs, and
eliminating their special privileges, such as purchase preferences.  This was accompanied
by a liberalization of trade and investment regulations to facilitate private-sector expansion.
Although some progress has been made, India's  PE reform effort has not been successful so
far.
H. Senegal
Senegal started its PE reform in 1978 and initially focused on corporatization.  The
authorities implemented performance contract  for 9 PEs, but financial performance did not
improve much.  Since 196,  the government has been maldng efforts to liquidate or
privatize PEs.  Until now, the prvatized  enterprises were very small with minority
government shares.  Therefore privatizations did not lead to managerial changes.  However,
in 1989, the govemrnment  restructured and decreased its ownership of individual banks to
less than 25 percent, which reportedly hardened the financial constraints facing the PEs.21
I. Gbana
While Ghana recognized  the need to implement  PE reform in 1983,  it was not until
1987 that a comprehensive  reform program  was adopted. The govemment's reform focused
on corporatization  of strategic  enterprises  and divestiture  of non-strategic  enterprises
through privatization  or liquidation. The success  of the PE reform has been quite limited.
Corporatization  largely failed because  sectoral ministries  have proven unwilling  to refrain
from interfering  in managerial  decisions. Attempts  to improve  the financial  discipline of
the PEs have not been successful. The privatization  program,  which is still ongoing, has
had a negligible  impact,  liquidating  or privatizing  mostly very small enterprises.22
IV.  Initial  State  of the Financial  Sector and  Public Enterprise  Reform
One of the conclusions of this paper is that countries with initially relatively well-
developed financial systems enjoy comparatively morc successful PE reforms than countries
with comparatively underdeveloped financial systems.  This section's first two sub-sections
develop measures of financial development and cstablish the linkagc between aggregatc
measurcs of the initial level of financial developmcnt and successful PE reform. The last
two sub-sections discuss the role of (1) developed capital markets in cxpanding the set of
privatization options, and (2) developed financial system in promoting diffecrent  types of
corporatization.
A. Measuring Financial Develonment
We first identify the indicators that we use to evaluate the extent of financial
development of nine country cases.  Each indicator is imperfect and suffers from a number
of conceptual problems, but together they provide a useful "picture" of financial
development.  We then discuss how the financial indicators compare across regions of the
world with different per capital income levels.  Finally, based on these financial indicators
we classify the case-study countries into three categories of financial development prior to
starting their respective PE refonns.
A.].  Financial Indicators:  We mainly use four indicators to assess the state of
financial sector development.  The first is a traditional measure of "financial depth:"  the
size of the formal financial intennediary sector relative to economic activity.  We call this23
indicator DEPTH, defined as the ratio of liquid liabilities  of the financial system to GDP.'
This is an indicator of the degree to which the formal financial sector mobilizes domestic
savings, so that larger depth should in most cases reflect greater financial development.
However, the size of the financial system may not capture financial services such as
risk management, information  processing, and corporate governance. The extent of
development of a country's stock market may augment the information contained in
DEPTH by capturing these financial services, since better developed stock markets make it
easier for individuals to price and diversify risks, to raise capital, and to take-over poorly
managed firms.  Thus, the second indicator we use is a traditional measure of stock market
development, MCAP/GDP, the ratio of market capitalization  to GDP.'  Higher values of
MCAP/GDP should reflect greater financial development.
Our third indicator measures the importance of private non-bank financial
institutions by computing the share of private non-bank financial intermediary assets in total
financial assets.  Non-banks complement commercial banks, and more importantly, they
often function as effective substitutes for the commercial  banking sector when that sector is
suppressed by government regulations or taxation.  Non-banks are less likely to funnel
credit to the government or PEs.  Thus, for many countries, larger non-bank financial
intermediaries reflect a broadening and deepening of the financial system.
Another indicator of the Sxtent of govermment  control in the banking sector is the
ownership structure of banks.  To the extent there is a large PE sector, banldng system is
7  Liquid  liabilities  consist  of cunrency  held outside  the bankdng  system  plus deannd and iterest  bearing  liabilities  of
banks and nonbank  financial  intermediaries.  This  equals "M3.- When  it is not available M12"  is used.
8  Denirgfi-Kaurt and Levine  (1993)  discuss  a broad  range of stock  market  indicators.24
generally  dominated  by public  banks  that provide  fnancing to the PEs at non-market  terms.
If the banking  sector  is mostly  private  however,  PEs are less likely  to have  access to
subsidized  financing. Thus, our fourth indicator  is commercial  bank ownership  which
capures  the banking sector's degree of independence  from the government and the extent
of competition in the credit market.
A.2. Comparison Across Different Regions: Figure I gives the 1991 averages of
tbree of our financial indicators for four regions of the world: Sub Saharan Africa (Africa),
Latin America (LAAM), Asia, and the OECD.  1991 GDP per capita figures for Africa,
Latin America, Asia, and OECD are $705, $1489, $2611, and $15,016, respectively.  As
shown in Figure 1, moving from poorer to richer countries generally involves greater
financial development as defined by our financial indicators. Although none of the
indicators is perfect, overall they illustre  a useful pattem.  OECD countries lead with the
highest level of financial development  since all our indicators, non-banks, MCAP/GDP, and
DEPTH have the highest values for OECD. Asian countries follow with high financial
depth and stock market captlization.  The importance  of non-bank financial institutions is
a distinguishing factor, since for Asian countries our indicator is quite lower than that of
OECD countries.  Latin America follows Asia with considerably  lower financial depth and
stock market capitalizntion. Afican  countries have the lowest level of financial
development, with lowest non-bank and MCAP/GDP values, although the value for DEPTH
is slightly higher than that of Latin American countries. Based on Figure 1, these indicators
in general,  provide  an intuitively  appealing  ranking  of financial  developnment  across25
countries.  Now, we turn to evaluating the initial level of financial development in our case
countries prior to their PE reforms.
A.3. CIassifying the Case-Study Countries based on the Initial Stare of their
Financial  Sectors:  When the financial systems of countries prior to PE refonns are ranked
based on the four indicators, DEPTH, MCAP/GDP,  the importance  of private non-bank
financial institutions, and bank independence  from government, they fall into three
categories along a spectrum (see Table 4).  Korea, Mexico, Chile II, and the Philippines had
relatively well-developed financial systems prior to undertaking PE reforms.  Financial
depth was over 30 percent of GDP, and they had relatively significant stock markets.  Their
private non-bank financial intermediaries  had a significant share of financial assets (around
15 to 30 percent) complementing the commercial  banks.  Senegal and Ghana, are at the
other end of the spectrum with underdeveloped  financial systems.  They had low levels of
fmancial depth, no stock markets or private non-bank financial institutions in the formal
sector, weak banking systems, and generally a very underdeveloped  financial infrastructure.
Finally, Chile 1, Egypt, Turkey and India 9 are difficult to rank and fall in between, since
their financial systems are not as underdeveloped,  but still less-developed compared to the
first group of countries.
B. Initial Financial Development  and Public Enterprise Reforn
The experiences of the nine countries we study indicate a strong correlation between
the initial state of their financial systems and the success of their PE reforms. As Table 4
9  Idia has large and diversified  fnancial intrmediaries  and its capital  market is one of the oldest  and largest  among
developing  countries. However,  the  ndia  fnancial systm is publicly-owned  for die most part and very highly  reguLaed.
Since  the indicators  we use atach grat  iporance  to existence  of private  instimudons  and indepdce  from governent
interfedn,  Inia  is not ranked  witin  the first group of countries.26
shows all of the most successful PE reform cases started out with relatively well-developed
financial systems.  Korea, Mexico, Chile-II, and the Philippines had higher levels of
financial depth, relatively well-developed stock markets, and other non-bank financial
institutions prior to undertaking their PE reforms than the other cases.
Countries that started out with less developed financial systems (Chile-I, India,
Turkey, Egypt) or under-developed  financial systems (Senegal and Ghana) were not as
successful in their PE reforms.  These countries had lower financial depth, highly regulated
banks, less developed non-banks, and either insignificant or nonexistent stock markets prior
to  their PE reforms.  One apparent exception is Chile's successful corporafization  in its first
reforn  period.  However, Chile's corporatization involved greater government control of
enterprise managers, investment and financing decisions, and therefore relied much less on
the initial state of its financial sector to provide these services to PEs.
The nine country cases are consistent with the hypothesis that an initially well-
developed  financial system  promotes successful PE reform.  As discussed in conceptual
overview, a well-developed financial system will tend to assist PE reform by allocating
funds to more efficient firms, by forcing other firms to restructure or fail, and by efficiently
redeploying the assets of these bankrupt enterprises. While an initially well-developed
fmancial system facilitates PE reform, courntries  with initifally  less-developed financial
systems should not give up undertaking PE reforms.  As we discuss below, financial reform
is a long-term process that can be synchronized with PE reforms to promote success.
C. Initial Stock Market Development and Public Enterprise Reform
In our country cases, the initial state of the stock market seems to have played a role27
in influencing the PE reform strategy and the eventual success or failure of the reform
process in at least two ways.  First, the existence of a well-developed stock market provides
different alternatives for piivatization; and second, a well-functioning  stock market can be
an important source of financing for privatization transctions.
Cl.  Privatization Strategy:  The extent of stock market development helps
determine available options for privatization.  Privatizations  are usually handled through: (i)
public offerings, in which the shares of the PEs are sold on the stock exchange resulting in
a widespread public ownership, or (ii) block sales of the enterprise to a single purchaser or
group of investors, resulting in more concentrated ownership.
A well-developed stock market promotes privatizations by enabling public offerings.
Using a public offering to obtain widespread public ownership of enterprises requires a
sufficiently liquid stock market to be able to absorb the new issues without negativey
affecting the market as a whole.  In Chile's first reform period, when the stock market was
not adequately developed, the government sold controlling stakes of the enterprises in
auctions.  This concentrated economic power in the hands of a few groups.  In the second
reform period, however, Chile's stock market was much more developed as a result of the
earlier financial liberalization, the sirnultaneous  strengthening of the regulatory and
supervisory framework, and the privafiation  of the pension fund system.  Thus the
govdernent  was able to sell smal  to medium-sized  packages of shares through the stock
market and obtain a broader distribution of ownership.
The existence of a well-developed  stock market also makes it easier for governments
to privatize since privatizations  that lead to widespread public ownership are often28
politically more acceptable to the public than sales to a small group of investors -
particularly if the investors are foreign.  Also, public share offerings have a great advantage
over private sales in ternis of transparency,  particularly in countries where less than
completely clean transactions between private and public sectors have been common.  For
exanple, in Turkey block sales of PEs to foreign investors were extremely controversial
and led to charges that the goverlnent  was essentially giving away public assets to
foreigners.  When the government decided to privatize by public sales through the stock
exchange, this change was welcomed by the public.' 0 Another example is Mexico, where
block-sales of the PEs have also been criticized for favoring a few investors, who have
become very rich as a result of the privatizations."
Well-developed,  booming stock markets can also help decrease opposition to
privatization by makng  employee or management  buyouts feasible.  A good example is the
privatization of TELMEX, the Mexican phone company, in which the union was offered
4.4 percent share of the company for $325 million.  Following its privatization, the market
value of TELMEX rose to $30 billion, resulting in an increase of 400 percent over the
employees' purchase price.' 2 Such gains make it very difficult for unions to oppose
privatization, even if it is likely to result in job losses.  Chile also relied on share purchases
by employees to some extent in its second period of privatizations, when the Chilean stock
market was booming.
10 Although  complaints  arose as soon  as the  prices of shares sarted to fall. See Sanger  (1993).
Sec The New York Times, October  27. 1993.
12  Sc  Pankaj Tandon,  hmexicju  from We4fare  Coneqm  of Selling  Pnbflc  Entervpises:  Case  Studiesfrom  Clde,
Malaysia,  Mexico  and he UK The World  Bank, 1992.29
Conversely, underdeveloped  stock markets may hamper the ability of the
govenmuent  to structure a privadtion  satisfactorily. For example, Swanson and Wolde-
Samait (1989) assert that one of the reasons for  ilure  of the Ghanaian and the Senegalese
privatization efforts was the lack of a domestic equity market on which public share
offerings could be floated.  Eaily privatization efforts in Turkey were also adversely
affected by the relatively under-developed  state of its equity market  A government
announcement in  1987 that it planned to accelerate its privatization program through new
issues was one of the important factors that caused a sharp fall in the market and stalled the
reform program. Even when there is a well-developed stock market, success of
privatization strategies which rely heavily on public offerings depend to a large extent on
the general stock market environment. For example, Korea also used its stock market in its
privatzation  program, however slowed down its efforts partly due to a down turn in its
stock market since 1989.13
C2.  Financing of Privatization: Both public offerings and block sales must draw on
domestic or foreign savings. Stock markets can play an important role in financing the
privatztions  by complementing the banking system's ability to mobilize savings.  For
example in Ghana, a number of agreed privatization transactions could not be completed
due to the inability of the purchasers to secure financing.' 4 The MexiCaU  privatiation
program used a sealed-bid auction process to sell controlling stakes in each company and
therefore, the stock market was not the direct mechanism of sale.  However,.the stock
13  See Saeger  (1993).
14  Sec World  Bank, "Regional Std  on  Public  Enterprise  Reform  and  Privon  in Africa,"  1993.30
market still provided important support as groups involved in the bidding issued equity to
finance their bids.  Eight financial groups raised a total of over 4 billion pesos in new
equity in 1992, including 2.4 billion pesos domestically,  to help finance the purchases of
the commercial banks.  The ability to attract sizable inflows of foreign portfolio investment
also enhances the viability of a privatization  program.  Indeed, privatization programs in
both Mexico and second period of Chile benefitted greatly from an inflow of foreign
portfolio investment to their stock markets.
C3.  Privatization and Stock Market Development.  Although the existence of a well-
developed stock market is important in structring  a successful  privatization, the absence of
a highly-developed stock market should not be used as an excuse not to privatize.  If
carefully implemented, privatization itself can make a major contribution to capital market
development  It is true that the absence of a domestic equity market makes a conventional
public offering of shares through brokers infeasible.  But governments committed to reform
-ave  found alternative ways to sell PEs to domestic wealthholders. For example, Turkey
used bank branches as a substitute for brokerages in the 1988 divestiture of the
government's minority stake in Teletas, and in the privatization of the Bosphorus Bridge
and the Keban Dam, which were heavily oversubscribed  and sold to a total of 15,000
domestic investors.  These banks are now building upon the experience with those sales and
attempting to capitalize on the rapid development of capital markets by evolving into
universal banks.  The Chilean privatizations since 1985 have involved the sale of stock to
institutional investors and employees equal in value to nearly 10 percent of the domestic
stock market capitalization. Again, rather than putting stress on the stock market, the31
increased capitalization has strengthened itL In Senegal, the government was even able to
sell a small slhnre  offering by newspaper."
Admittedly, privatization in the absence of a well-developed stock market does
require flexibility in structuring the privatization, including greater reliance on private share
placements than might be necessary with a developed stock market.  It also requires
creativity in marketing and distributing shares to the market.  In addition, the cost of
rejecting foreign participation in the privatization program will be higher when domestic
capital markets are weak.  Nevertheless, a well-developed stock market is not a necessary
condition for privatization.
D.  Initial Financial Development and Corporatization
An initially well-developed financial system promotes corportion  that relies on
greater PE autonomy as well corporatization that involves enhanced government oversight
Corporatization that relies on greater public enterprise autonomy requires a sufficiently
well-developed and independent financial system to impose hard budget constaint  and
cultivate market-based incentives, while a well-developed financial system indirecly
supports corporatization involving tighter govement  monitoring by promotig  private
sector development.  Successfil corporatization  in Korea and Chile-I involved intensified
government monitoring of managers and strict enforcement of  budget constraints.  The
government did not abdicate these responsibilities  to the financial systenL Nonetheless,
successful financial reform in Korea helped corporatization indirectly. By enhancing
resource mobilzation, credit allocation, and corporate govemance of private firms, financial
15  See Gavin (1993) for al  te  eaples.32
reforms in Korea contributed to private sector development and thereby indirecdy improved
"corporatized" PEs.  Specifically,  private sector growth seems to have promoted successful
corporatization  by intensifying competitive  pressures on PEs and increasing labor demand,
which eased political pressures on large PEs that are reducing labor to improve financial
performance.
In contrast, PE reform efforts in Senegal and Ghana were less successful than they
otherwise might have been because their corporatization  efforts included greater PE
autonomy from the govermment  without a sliffLciently  well-developed financial system to
impose a budget constraint and monitor managers.  Thus, banks continued to finance PE
losses, perhaps because of implicit government guarantees, and did not provide sufficient
incentives for PE managers to improve enterprise efficiency. Thus, corporatization that
relies on greater PE autonomy requires a sufficiently developed and independant financial
system to impose  budget constraints and cultivate market-based incentives,  wbile a well-
functioning financial system will indirecty bolster corporatization  involving intensified
government oversight by promoting private sector development33
V.  Financial Reform and Public Enterprise Reform
This section discusses the linkages between PE reform and financial sector reform.
A. Countries that successfully implemented large-scale PE reforms also implemented
successful  large-scale  financial sector reforms.  The  financial reforms  first  involved interest
rate liberalization, reduced directed credit, and less direct government control offinancial
intermediaries.  In successful countries, these  first  set offinancial reforms were followed by
(1) enhanced supervisory and regldatory capabilities and (2) a shrinkage of public banks
and an expansion of private financial intermediaries  through bank privatization and
strengthening of private financial intermediaries. As discussed above, there were three
cases of successful large-scale PE reform: Mexico-IL,  Chile-II, and Korea; each of these
countries also executed successful financial reforms.
First, consider Mexico-Il where between 1989 and 1993 the authorities privatized
many large PEs.  In 1982 there were 60 private financial institutions, including 35 banks.
In response to the economic crisis, the government nationalized all but two of these banks
in 1982 and reduced the number of state-owned banks to 18 through mergers and closures.
From 1982 to  1988, the govenment  tightly controlled the banling  system and used
commercial banks to finance the govemment and PEs.  Banks faced high reserve ratios,
interest controls, and had to lend most of their flmds to PEs and favored sectors at
concessionary interest rates.  Operating in a uncompetitive environment, over-manning and
inefficiencies blossomed in state-banks. During this period, non-bank fnancial  sector -
primarily brokerages, which were often managed by previous managers of the commercial
banks - operated in a much less repressed environment  and became important sources of34
finance for the private sector.  By 1987, nonbanks held more than 50 percent of financial
system's assets, and state-banks  held less than half (Euromoney, Jan. 1993).
Financial liberalization began late in 1988. The government freed interest rates,
eliminated forced investment in government secuiities, and abolished exchange controls,
while also strengthening the regulatory environment by imposing capital limits and
conservative prudential regulations.  The stock market, which had deteriorated in the 1980s,
started improving with the liberalization. Bank lending to the private sector increased from
25 percent of total assets in 1986 to almost 60 percent in 1991.
Liberalization and improvements  in the regulatory system set the stage for
privatization of the entire commercial banking system in 1991-1992. Accompanying
privatization, the govermnent intensified programs to improve supervision and regulation.
Although it is too early to judge the success of Mexican financial reform, many observers
consider Mexican bank privatization a success and a model for other countries.
The private banking system is helping to finance industial  growth, including the re-
tooling and re-orientation of former PEs.  Mexico's financial system is relatively well-
developed, with an active securities market (market capitalization is aiound 36 percent of
GDP), a diverse set of non-bank financial intermediaries, and a thriving commercial
banking industry such that financial DEPTH is greater than 33 percent.  Financial reform
accompanied and seems to have assisted PE privatization.  The case of Mvexico-II  is
consistent with the view that large-scale PE privatization will typically require meaningful
and effective financial sector reforms - including bank privatization - to bolster the
provision of critical financial services to the growing private sector.35
The results  from Chile-IT  also support  this conclusion. Chile  began  its second PE
refonn episode  in 1985. The authorities  re-privatized  companies  that were taken-over  by
the government  during  ihe 1982 economic  crisis and also sold large  PEs that had not been
privatized  during Chile's first PE reform  episode  in 1974-1982. During  Chile-II,  the
authorities  also implemented  important  financial  sector  reforms  and designed  many of these
reforms  to avoid the circumstances  that contributed  to the 1982  crisis.
During  the first reform  period,  the government  implemented  many financial  reforns.
They abolished  interest  rate ceilings,  eliminated  credit  allocation  controls,  reduced  banks'
reserve  requirements,  freed capital  controls,  and allowed  new entry. The authorities  also
pnvatized  state-banks  during Chile-I  but without  first establisng  a sound  regulatory  and
supervisory  system. New bank owners  used their  privileged  access  to credit  to purchase
PEs, thus establishing  a small  number  of huge conglomerates. In the absence  of effective
regulation,  this provided  an environment  amenable  for unsound  banldng  practices  and
contributed  to the economic  crisis  of 1982  that will be discussed  below.
Following  the 1982 crisis,  Chile  recapitalized  and re-privatized  the banks.
Importantly,  duing this second  reform  episode,  Chile significantly  strengthened  the role,
staff, and funding  of prudential  supervision  and regulation.  In addition  to its banking
system,  Chile  also has non-bank  financial  intermediaries,  including  a large private  pension
fimds. Today,  Chile's private  financial  system  is quite  well-developed  and supports  a
booming  private  industrial  sector. Financial  DEPTH  is almost  50 percent  of GDP, and the
stock market  capitalization  to GDP  ratio is over 95 percent. Thus, Chile-I is also
consistent  with the hypothesis  enunciated  above:  large-scale  public  enterprise  reform36
benefits  from financial  sector  reforns which  include  liberalization,  strengthening  of
prudential  supervision  and regulation,  and privatization.
Korea  also combined  large and generally  effective  PE reform  with significant
financial  sector  reforms  during  the 1980s,  though  Korea's PE reforms  focussed  primarily  on
corportization. Korea's corporatization  efforts  involved  intensified  government  monitoring
of pubic enterprises through a rigorous managerial performance evaluation system."
These  reforms  improved  PE performance.
Korea also initiated  important  financial  sector  reforms  during  the 1980s. Early in
the reform  process  Korea liberalized  interest  rates,  reduced  directed  credits,  ;owered  entry
bafriers,  and formalized  the curb market  into an important  and booming  private  nonbank
fimancial  intermediary  sector. Korea  strengthened  supervisory  procedures  of both banks  and
nonbanks  during  the 1980s. Banks  were also privatized  in 1983,  but without  cleaning  their
portfolios  of bad loans or recapitalizing  the banks,  so that the privatized  banks  remained
dependent  on the government  for subsidies. Later  bailouts  of both nonfinancial  firns and
banks  decreased  the non-performing  loans  to less than 1 percent  of commercial  banks
assets,  but the government  still retains  significant  control  over bank lending  decisions.
While  bank lending  as a share  of GDP stagnated  in the 1980s,  nonbank  cre&it  as a share of
GDP has boomed  from around 10 percent  in 1976  to close to 40 percent  by the end of the
1980s. Thus,  as in Mexico-Il  and Chile-II,  financial  liberalization,  a strengt.cning  of
supervision  and regulation  of financial  intermediaries,  and development  of fik,ancial
intermediaries  focussed  on providing  market-oriented  services  also accompanied  successful
1  Koran cwpolraiztion  also involved  greater  autonomy  of day-to  management  decisions  while  keeping
management  criteria  focused  on  botom line issues.37
PE reform in Korea. Although  the independent  relationship  between financial reform and
corporatization  is difficult  to assess, it is important  to establish  that successful  large-scalc
corporatization  went hand-in-hand  with substantial  financial  sector reforms.
B. Countries that were less successful in reforming PEs did not imnplement  successful
financial sector reforms (including liberalization of interest rates and credit decisions,
enhanced supervision and regulation, improvements in legal codes acnd  enforcement
capabilities,  and public  bank privatization) along with or before PE reform.  As noted
above, Egypt, India, Turkey, Ghana, and Senegal have had, on aggregate, much less
successful PE reform than Korea, Mexico-11,  Chile-lI, and the Philippines.  Importantly,
these same countries also did not implement comprehensive financial reform and bank
privatization - on the scale attained by Mexico-l1, Chile-lI, and Korea - early in their PE
reforms.  Recent Turkish financial refnnns, however, should facilitate future PE reforms.
The remainder of this section reviews financial reform efforts in Egypt, India,
Turkey, Senegal, and Ghana.  The Appendix provides more details.  Reviewing financial
reform helps one understand why PE reform has been relatively less successful in these
countries and what financial reforms need to be stressed in the future.
B. 1. Egypt and India: During the 1960s and 1970s, both Egypt and India pursued
public sector  led development strategies.  Consequently, state-owned banks dominate the
financial landscape in both countries.  For example, state-owned banlks hold over 90 percent
of total banking asses in India and and over 50% in Egypt.  State banks are used to finance
government  expenditures and provide subsidized credits to PEs.  Furthermore, both
countries used pension reserves to finance PEs, public banks, and government projects.38
Prior to the  1980s, there were heavy taxes on banks, stiff barriers to entry, tightly controlled
interest rates, and inadequate prudential supervision and regulation.  In both Egypt and
India, financial reforms staited in 1992.  Egypt and, to a lesser degree, India have eased
interest rate controls, strengthened prudential regulation and supervision, relaxed entry
barriers, and capitalized some weak public banks.  Reform efforts are continuing in both
countries with the goals of reducing domination by state banks and increasing private sector
participation.  Serious bank privatization has not yet occurred in either country; though,
Egypt privatized one public-private joint-venture in 1993.  While Egypt and to a somewhat
lesser degree India are setting the stage for successful PE reform in the future by reforming
the financial system, successful large-scale PE reform will probably require a greater
willingness to privatize large state-banks if they are to break the legacy of state-dominated
fmance.
B.2. Turkey:  Turkey initiated PE and financial sector reform in the  1980 as PEs
increasingly used government transfers, loans from state banks, pension reserves, and
credits from the Central Bank to cover operating expenses.  The main focus of the reform
program was on deregulation to increase competition and efficiency within the financial
system.  The govemrnment  removed interest rate ceilings on interest rates, relaxed
restrictions on domestic and foreign bank entry, and expanded the scope of banking
activities.  Another element of the govemment's  stabilization program was tight monetary
policy which led to high interest rates.  While the liberalization of interest rates was
successful in greatly increasing the mobilization of savings through banks, high interest
rates caused difficulties for corporate borrowers.  Firms increasingly borrowed to cover39
interest payments, and banks started to compete fiercely to attract new deposits.  Given
inadequate regulation and supervision, the eventual result was a crisis in  1982, which led to
the closure of several private banks; liberalization without adequate supervision helped
foster financial instability.
The crisis shifted the emphasis of the reform program from deregulation to building
a sound regulatory framework.  The government reimposed ceilings on deposit rates,
enacted the banking law of  1985 which initiated the process of improving prudential
regulations, and established the Capital Market Board to regulate and develop securities
market.  Interest rates were again liberalized in 1988, although some ceilings still remain.
Turkey's  financial system has developed significantly in the last decade.  Financial
DEPTH is around 32 percent, stock market capitalization is almost 20 percent of GDP, and
nonbanks are growing.  However, financial intermediation is still heavily taxed both  directly
and indirectly through high reserve and liquidity ratios, and state-banks have not been
privatized.  The barning  system remains 50 percent publicy-owned.  Recently, the
government slated several state banks for privatization.
B.3. Ghana:  In Ghana, PEs play a dominant role in most sectors of the economy,
and state-owned banks dominate the financial system.  PEs are very heavy users of bank
credit often with  government guarantees, and taxes, tariffs, and social security fimds all
support PEs.  Indeed the financial system is best viewed as an extension of the fiscal
system which is used to finance priority PEs.  There is little to no systematic monitoring of
credit to public enterprises and non-payment by PEs is a huge problem.40
Some financial sector have been implemented in Ghana.  In  1987-88, interest rates
controls and sectoral credit targets controls (except  a agriculture) were eased, and the Bank
of Ghana began using indirect monetary control instruments.  In 1989-1992, Ghana
established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust to recapitalize seven banks, and
efforts were initiated to strengthen accounting, provisioning for bad loans, supervision, and
legal reforms.  Furthernore,  Ghana plans to reduce financial intermediary taxes, encourage
positive real interest rates, and divest some public sector banks in the future.  At present,
however, the financial system is still very underdeveloped with a DEPTH of 19 percent and
stock market capitalization of around one percent of GDP.  Significant financial sector
reforms will have to continue and probably intensify for PE reform to promote economic
development successully  in Ghana.
B.4. Senegal:  Senegal's  PE sector accounted for almost 30% of total investnent,
about 17% of total employment, and 7% of GDP in 1988.  In addition, the government
plays a very heavy role in regulating private sector activities and allocating resources.  In
1989 Senegal initiated a banking refonn.  This included a bank restructuring and closure of
some distressed banks, privatization of some of the restructured banks, a reduction in
directed credits, and elimination of govermnent guarantees of PE borrowing, and a
reduction of govermnent ownership of all banks to less than 25 percent.  Although Senegal
still has a very underdeveloped financial system with a financial DEPTH of 25 percent and
no stock market, the financial sector reforms are promising steps.  As these financial
reforms improve financial development and if Senegal strengthens existing efforts, the41
ability of the Senegalese financial to provide market-coriented  financial will grow and foster
more aggressive PE refonn.
C  Countries that implemented modest - though successful - public enterprise
privataizton  in the presence of an already relatively well-developed  financial  system did
not simultaneously implement large financial  sector reforms. The Philippines successfully
privatized a limited number of government corporations in the late 1980s.  As indicated in
Table 4, the Philippines already had a relatively deep financial system with a well
functioning capital market, a strong nonbank sector, and private commercial banks when it
initiated PE refonn.  Financial reform in the first half of the 1980s helped build a financial
system capable of supporting enterprise reform in the second half of the 1980s.
Specifically, liberalization of interest rates in the early 1980s, strengthening of the legal
framework, bankruptcy laws, regulations, and prudential enforcement capabilities in  1987,
and reducdon in the role of public banks from 28% of banking assets to  14% of banling
assets over the  1980s helped mold a financial system that was ready to support modest
public enterprise privatization in the late 1980s.
Similarly,  Mexico's first PE reform from 1981-1987  was not accompanied  by
substantial financial sector reforms.  This first reform period focused on privatizing and
liquidating small enterprises and limiting the losses of large PEs.  Although Mexico's
banldng system was publicly owned during this first reform period, Mexico had a relatively
well-functioning capital market and very well-developed nonbanks.  The experiences of the
Philippines and Mexico-I are consistent with the view that if the financial system is
sufficiently well-developed at the start of the PE reforn  process and PE reform is of a42
modest scale, then substantial financial sector reforms do not have to be implemented to
promote successful PE reform.
D.  Unsuccessful financial  sector reform can hurt large-scale public  enterprise
reform  Chile implemented large-scale PE and financial reforms during their first reform
episode,  1974-1982.  Out of the 504 firms controlled by the government in  1973, only  109
remained publicly owned in 1982.  In all sectors except mining, govermment's share of
production fell by about 70 percent.  The government also imposed a rigid budget
constraint on PEs: PEs had to selffinance  projects; any borrowing from banks had to be
cleared with officials under strict guidelines; and no government guarantees were issued.
Thus, the private  sector grew substantially, and corporatization improved PE performance.
Chile's  financial liberalization and bank privatization, however, facilitated  the 1982
crisis. 17 Specifically, banks were privatized before nonfinancial PEs.  Business
conglomerates  - grupos  - purchased  most  of the  banks  with  only  a 20 percent  down
payment and borrowed the remainder from the government.  Grupos then used loans from
their banks to purchase nonfinancial firms, where the government required only a down
payment of between  10 and 40 percent.  This highly-leveraged concentration of industrial
and fmancial power together with an ineffective, understaffed, and under-funded bank
supervisory system encouraged insider lending, reduced the effectiveness with which banks
evaluated clients, and weakened objective bank monitoring of firm managers.  When
domestic economic problems, external shocks, and inconsistent foreign exchange rate
policies, caused some nonfinancial grupo firms to flounder, the grupos used their banks -
17  See Cores-Dcuglas (1992), De la Cuadra and Valdes-Prieto  (1992), and Edwards anti Edwards (1987).43
with government insured deposits - to support failing firms in a doomed attempt to avoid
realizing losses.  In the resulting 1982 depression, GDP fell by  14 percent, unemployment
soared past 25 percent, and the govermnent had to take control of enterprises and banks that
accounted for 60 percent of total bank deposits.  While changes in world interest rates and
inconsistent exchange rate and wage policies would have combined to negatively affect the
Chilean economy with or without the financial reforms on the late 1970s, the lack of sound
prudential supervisory and regulatory capacity created a fragile financial system that
exacerbated the economic down turn and mitigated the success of Chile's  first PE reform
episode.  Chile's  experience suggests bank privatization and liberalization of interest rates
and credit controls are not enough.  Sound supervision and regulation must also be in place
or the financial system will not be able to support aggressive PE privatization.44
VI.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
We find a striking link between financial development and the success of public
enterprise reform: countries with initially relatively well-developed financial systems
enjoyed better PE reform than countries with less well-developed financial systems; and,
countries that synchronized financial reform with PE reform enjoyed greater success than
countries that tried large-scale PE reforms without improving their financial systems.  Since
we only examine nine cases and focus only on the financial system among many other
factors - macroeconomic, political, institutional, labor market, and product market factors -
that may affect the success of PE reforms, our conclusions are suggestive.  Nevertheless, by
highlighting-the linkages between the financial system and PE reform we seek to emphasize
that once all the other conditions for a successful PE reform are met, those reforms that
also incorporate financial factors will have a greater probability of success.
Based on our analysis, we make the following tentative recommendations for
countries contemplating public enterprise reform:
(1)  If a country has an initially very under-developed financial system, PE reformers
should consider a strategy that relies less on the financial system for its initial
success and start developing the foundations for a well-functioning financial system.
Specifically, corporatization that consists of improved direct government monitoring
of enterprise managers, firm investment decisions, and PE financing may contain
losses and improve performance without relying excessively on the financial system.
At the same time, financial reforms, especially liberalization and improvements in45
legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems, should be initiated to etablish  the
financial sector basis for more comprehensive, large-scale PE reform involving
expanded enterprise autonomy and privatization and also for more comprehensive
and complementary financial reforms involving state bank privatization and further
liberalization and financial infrastructure building.
(2)  If a ccuntry has an initially relatively well-developed financial system, and the
country decides to implement large-scale PE reform, the reform should be
synchronized with substantial and well-designed financial sector reformns. Large
scale PE reform involves much greater reliance on the services provided by the
financial system.  Therefore, a comprehensive PE reform should also involve the
reform of public banks that often exist to serve the PE sector.  A sound financial
ictorm  which includes bank privatization is an important component of any large-
scale PE reform and its design is crucial since just as well-designed financial sector
reforms can promote PE reform, poorly designed financial sector reforms can
jeopardize  the success of the PE reform.
(3)  If a country has an initially relatively well-developed financial system, and the
country decides to implement small to moderate-scale PE reform, then the reforns
can succeed without substantial financial sector reforns.  However, unless the PE
sector is small to start with, small-scale PE reforms, by definition, wull still leave
much work for future reform efforts.46
(4)  If a countrj has an initially relatively  well-developed  financial  system,  the country
can also choose between different  types of reform in addition  to choosing  the scale
of the PE reform.  A well-developed  financial  system will promote all PE reform
strategies either directly (privatization,  private sector development,  corporatization
with increased autonomy)  or indirectly  (corporatization  with greater government
control). Since these are all feasible  choices for a country with an initially well-
developed  financial system,  the choice may be based on other factors such as
political pressures or relative sustainability  of different options.47
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Table 1: Privatization and the Changing Provision of Financial Services
Less reliance on:  More reliance on:
Mobilizing  Resources  - Taxes  - Financial  intermediaries:  Banks,
to finance enterprises  investment companies, pension fumds, - State-owned banks  insurance  companies
Capital markets
Allocating  Resources  - Direct and indirect government  - Financial intermediaries: Banks,




- Private banks compelled by the state
Corporate Governance  - Govemment  or government  ministries  - Financial  intermediaries:  Banks,
of enterprises  investment companies, pension funds,
insurance companies
- _  - Capital markets51
Table 2: Financial Development and the Success of Public Enterprise Reform
Under-Developed Financial System  Well-Developed Financial Svstem
Privatization/  Execution:  Difficult to privatize with poorly  Execution:  Easier to privatize with liquid,
Private Sector Development  functioning banks and capital markets  well-functioning equity markets
and sound bank
Prospects:  Poor: Sustainable private sector
growth requires a sound financial  Prospecs:  Good: Financial systen  will
system  support and promote private
sector growth
Corporatization with  Prospects:  Poor: PEs will receive poor services;  Prospects:  Better: Financial system will
Greater Autonomy  lack of corporate governance could be  service PEs.
disastrous
Unsustainable & Not Credible:  Sustainability?:  Performance
Financial system will not provide  may improve, but goveanment
good services; government  will  may renege on autonomy and
eventually mobilize, finance, and  exert pressr  to fund
govem PEs.  politically popular PEs
Corporatization with  Prospects:  Fair: Financial system minor factor in  Prospects:  Better. Financial  ystem will
Less Autonomy  outcome  promotes private sector and
therefore indily  help
I________________________________  ,______________________________________________  corporization52
Table  3. P1 and  Fiancul  Setor Reforms
Country  PE Reform  P  Reform  Financial  Facl  Reform
Period  Reform
Period
Korea  1. 1981-1983  Pivatizations.  Four  state-owned  banks  and two  other  PEs  1980  . A gradual  reform  strted In 1980.
were sold  through  public  offerings  although  government  Deposit  rates  were  pardally  liberalized  to esablisb  positive  real  rates. influence  remained  strong. Program  was  reportedly  Preferental  lending  rates  were  abolished  in 1982.
successful  in increasing  efficiency.  Privatization  of dts public  city  banks  stared in 1982  a  was  completed  by
1983. il.1983-1985  Corporzatiaon.  Financial  performance  of PEs  improved  Restricdons  on non-bank  frial  intistudons  were  relaxed.  New  domesic
substantaly,  although  started  deteriorating  later. The  entry  into  die financial  system  was  allowed.
program  was  very  successful  in the  short  run.  A grdual opening  up to intermationl  competdton  std.  Capital  masets
were  also  gradually  opened  to foreign  participatiorL
m.  1986-  Privatizadons.  In 1991,  7 PE subsidiries  and Korea  Stock  Lending  rtes were  officially  deregulated  in 1988.  In 1991,  governmeat Exchange  were  privatized.  Govemnment  is planning  to  announced  a plan  to ccmpletely  deregulate  money  market  ard deposit tes privatize  11  more  PEs, while  remaining  a majority  by 1997.
shareholder  in 6.  It is too  early  to tell  if the  program  is
successful.
Mexico  1. 1983-1987  Privatizatdonliquidationof  small  PEs. Corporatization  of  1988-  Fuancial  sector  reform  suited in 1988  with  lieralization  of intrest rates. large  PEs. 743 small  PEs  were  liquidated  or sold.  Exchange  controls  wrcm  abolished,  forced  invesmenr  in government Corporazation  had  limited  success,  securities  was  eliminated  an  nost  of the restrktions  on comnercial  bank
activity  were  lifited  during  1989. 11.1988-1993 Privadzadon  of large  PEs. 192  large  PEs  were  privadzed.  Reguladon  and supervision  were  strengthened  during  1989-1990.
The  privatizaden  program  is considered  to be very  Banks  privatization  started  in 1991  and was  complted  in 1992.
succssful,  both  in temns  of budgetary  Impact  and increase
in efficiency.
Chile  1. 1974-1982  Privatizadon  of small  PEs  and  corporadzadon  of  1974-  Fuiacial liberlization  strted in 1974  with  interest  ratc  lieralization. remaining  ones. Most  of the  privatized  PEs  were re-  Banks  were  privadzed  (1975-77).  Entry  restritions  were  relaxed,  credit nationalized  after  the 1982  crisis. Corporatizations  were  ceilings  were eliminated,  permittd scope  of acivities  were expanded. successful  in improving  the performance  of PEs.  Pension  funds  were  privarized  in 1980.
Restrictions  on foeign  capital  inlows were  gradully lifted  saring in
11.1985-1990 Privatizations.  After  re-privatzation  of firrns  which  had  1977,  and capital  account  was  conletely liberalized  in 1910. revened  to government  control  during  the financial  crisis,  Financial  crisis  came  in 1982  aM the govcmmcrt  had  w clean  up and  bal larger  PEs  were  also  privatized. hThis  led to a significant  out  the  banks.
reducgon  in the ale of the  public  sector  in the  economy.  After  the  crisis,  prudential  regulation  and  supervision  was  strengthened.
The  privtizations  are viewed  as being  very  successful.  culmdng  in  the passge of a new  bankk$  lw  in 198653
Country  PE Reform  PE Reform  Financil  Financial Reform
Period  Reform
Period
Philippines  1986-  Pvadzadons  Although  privadzadons  are still condnuing,  1980-  Fmaial  sector  rorm  focusad  on stngdhe  ing die bankg  syster
government's  privadzadon  efforts  are considered  to be  reducing  taxadon and increasing  compedtion.
successful,  both in quandty  and impact  Banls were allowed to expand into new areas of activity  and loan uad
deposit rates were fred.
The shae of public banks in total banking  assets was reduced from 28% in
1980  to 14% in 199.
The reform also surted to address insitutional fears  suh  as te  legal
ftamework  and bankruptcy  laws.
Egypt  1980-  Reform efforts mnosdy  focused  on corporatizadon  and were  1992-  Fiacial  sector reform only srned  in 1992. lmerest res  were liberalized unsuccessful. Recendy there is revived  interest in  and prudental regulation  and supervision  were strengthened. Banks were corpotization  and privadzadon.  recapitalized  and enny barriers were relaxed. In 1993, one p  Tvarz/pzblc
__________  joint-venture  bank was  privatized.
Turkey  1980  Although  there was limited success  with corporattzadon  1980-  Financial  sector reform staed  with iterest  liberalIation on deposit and initially, generally  neither the corporamzation  or  loan rates in 1980. Commercial  banks were deregulated  and foreign bank
privatizadon  efforts have been successful. Recently,  there  entry was allowed.
ae  new efforts focusing  on privatiziadon.  Financial  crisis came in 1982. lnterest ceilings  were re-imposed  an  a
deposit  insurance system  was established.
Later reforms  emphasized  prudential  regulation  and improved  supervision
leading to a new banking  law in 1985. Interest  ntes  were partily
liberalized  in 1988. Recendy  several smc-owed  bauns  were slad  for _____________  _____________  _____________________________________________  priva  zad  on.
India  1980-  Corpouatizaion  efforts have not been successful. There  1992-  Financial  sector reform suited quite late, in 1992. Enty and expansion
have been new corporatizadon  and pnvatizadon  efforts  conditions  have been made less restrictive. Interest  rates on term loans and since 1991.  most debt instruments  were recently  deconuoDed  and increased. Reform
efforts to i'mprove  prudential  and regulatory  environment,  to recapitalize
weak institudons,  and to promote  greater private sector participation  and
further financial  policy liberalization  are continuing.
Senegal  1978-  Corporatization  and privatization  efforts have been  1989-  Financial  reformn  program started in 1989. and imcluded  restructuring  of unsuccessful  so far.  public banks, increasing  capital  requirenents, and improving  banking
supervision. Govemnenrn  ownership  in each bank was decreased  to less
than 25 percent.
Ghana  1987-  Corporatization  and privatization  efforts have been  1987-  The financial  reform initiated in 1987  included  a strengthening  of the
unsuccessful  so far.  regulatory  framework, liberalization  of govemnent controls, and bank
restructuring. Interest rates were liberalized  in 1988. 1989 banking  law
strengthened  bank reguladon  and supervision. In 1990, banks were
restructured  and government  announcedplans  to privanze  banks in 1993.54
Table  4.  PE Retornr and the Initial State of the Financial Systems
Country  PERefomrPenod  DEPTH  MCAPIGDP  Share  of Private  Non-Bank  Comrercial  Bank  Privazation
Financial Insdtudons  Bank Ownership  before
Reformn
WelPdeveloped  financial  systems:
OECD  n.a.  72  41  38  Mostly  privats  n.a.
Korea  1.  1981-83  39  10  30  Mostly  public  Banks  were  privaized  1982-83.
nl. 1983-85  40  8  32  70%  private  in the  fist reform  period.
1.  1986-  42  6  33  70% private
Mexico  1.  1983-87  39  6  100%  public  Banks  were  privadzed  1991-92,
11. 1988-93  39  6  15  100%  public  towards  the  cad of the second
reform period.
Chile  nI  1i. 1985-90  38  22  23  Mostly  private  Banks  were  privaized  1975-77,
during Chile 1.
Philippines  19S6-  34  4  16  Mostly  private  The  share  of public  banks  feD
fmm  28%  to 14%  of assets,
1980-90.
Less-developed  financial  systems:
Chile  I  1.  1974-82  33  5  Some  100%  public  Banks  were  privaized  1975-77.
_ealy  in the  reform  period.
Egypt  1980-  57  Some  Over  50%  public  lust starng. In 1993  one  joint
venture  bank  was  privized.
Turkey  1980-  32  1  Some  50  % public  There  axe  recent  plans,  but  no
bank  privatzation  so far.
India  1980-  36  4  None  90%  public  No  bank  privatization  so  far.
Underdeveloped  financial  systems:
Senegal  1978-  24  None  Mostly  public  In 1989.  governmnt  ownership
of banks  was  reduced  to less
_________  ;  _________  ________________  than  25 percent in each  bank.
Ghana  1987-  16  None  hMostly  public  There  are plans  but no bank
pratizaton  so far.
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Appefndx
Meico - bInanal  Setor Reforms
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
1.  Dereguladon  of the Financial Scctor
a.  Ceilings  on the issuance  of banker's acceptances  was removed.  X
b.  All intcrest rate controls and lending  restrictions  wcre abolished.  X
c.  Most resictdons on commercial  bank activity  were removed.  X
11.  Stmrnthenin  of Resulatory. Sunervisory  and Lneal Systms
a.  Extin  laws we  amended  to strengthen reguladon  and supervision.  X  X
[Il.  Reforn of Monetary  Conuul Instruments
a.  Reserve  requirements  were replaced by a 30% liquidity requiremnt
which was later abolished.  X
IV.  Resiucturina or PTlvatlation of Financial Inttutions
a.  Commercial  bank  were privadied.  x  X56
Turvey-  rlna.a Setor R  rms
1980  1981  1962  1963  1914  1935  1916  1987  1988  1969  1990
11.  Dereauladon  of di. Financial  Sector
a. Removal  of interest  rate  ceilings  on bank  deposits  and  loans  X
b. Ressactions  on foreign  bank  enty eased.  X
c. lanks wer  allowed  to expad into  new  areas  of acivity.  X
d. Ceilings  re-imposed  on deposh  mtes.  X
e. Istanbul  Stock  Exchange  was  re-opened.  X
f. Deposit  rates  liberalized  again  (with  informal  CB intervention)  X
H.  Strenadienigg  of Reulatory.  SUgrvisofw.  and  Legal  Systems
a. Capital  Market  BDan!  (CMI) was  established  with  the power  to
develop  and  regulate  the securities  natkets.  X
b. Deposit  Insuance  established.  X
c. New  Banking  Law  wpassed.  X
d. Minimum  capital  base  was  established  for  new  banks.  X
e. DIS  capita adeqacy  requirements  were  adopted.  X
f. Linit of 10%  imposed  on lending  to a single  customner.  X
g. Centra  Dank  supervision  and  accounting  standards  of the banking
system  was  improved.  X
m.  Reform  of Monetru Contol Intnzments
a. Lirits on extension  of credits  from  the Central  Bank.  X
b. Establishment  of a money  market  and  government  securides  auedons.  x
IV.  Restuctudmn  or Privtizadon  of Fmancial  Institutions
a. Failure  of a lading money-broker  precipitated  the  financial  crisis.  X
b. Several  state-owned  banks  are  slated  for  privatizadon.  xEpp  - FlnaIal  Secor  Reforms
1991  1992  1993
1.  Dereulationof  the Financial  Sector
a. Capital  account  opened;  interest  and exchange  rates  liberdized.  X
b. Foreign  bank  branches  worc  authorized  to engage  in  local  curmncy  business.  X
c. Bank  specific  credit  ceilings  were removed.  X
H.  Strengdieninw  of Regulatorv.  Supervisowr  and Leaal  SystemS
a. Minimum  capital  requirements  are established  aid capital  adequacy  stndards are adopted.  X
b. Asset  classificatIon  and provisioning  guidelines  intoduced.  X
c. Foreign  currrnEy  cxposure  reguladons  ismead iu  tmplemnted.  X
d. Loan exposure  limits  Imposed  at 25  % of capital  to suin  bormwers.  X
a.  Limtnu  on equity  holdings  lmposed.  X
f. Deposit  Insrance Fund  was  established.  X
g. Centrad  Bank  powers  wire strengdened  dumough  amnedments  to the  banking  law.  X
h. Bank  supevision  au  audit  practices  were Improved.  X
HM.  Reform  of Monetary  Control  Instiunents
a.  Cental Bank  staff  stexd training  for die lmplemen.tion  of open  mwttet  operaons
and indirect  nmods of monetjy control.  X
b.  Outstandg rtios for reserve nd  liquidity  requirements  decreased.  X
[V.  Resucturins or Puivaatidon  of Pinancial  Insti_otins
a. Public  banks  were re-capitalized.  X
b.  Deailed  audits  of public  and  other  commercal  banks.  X
c.  Restucturng  of problem  banks  staned.  X
d.  One  joina-venure  ban  (public-riva) was  privadd.  x58
1  - Finncl  Sedor Refrms
19m  1993
1.  Dereuuladon  of the Financial Setor
a.  Intercst  policy somewhat liberlized.  X
b.  Capitl rutes  were deregulated  and  their txadon was reformed.  X
a.  Entry of pnivate  banks were allowed,  guidelines  for entry wern Issued.  x
IL  Snntbeninp  of ReRulatory.  Sunervgsor and Lenl  Systems
a.  Reserve Bakn  of India (RBI)  introtuced new guidelines  for income
ecogniiom,  aet  claifkadon,  and pmvisioning  rquirements.  X
b.  BIS capIl  adquacy  requirements  are adopted with a phase-in period  of
dute  yun.  X
c.  Securides  exchage  boaid of  Mxlix  stted  co funidon as an  independent
regulatory  body.  X
d.  Legal  steps are being taken to Improve  the loan collecdon  mnechanisms  for
banks. 
e.  To modernize  supervisory  pracdces a new supervisory  body was established
under  dte aegis of REBI.  x
m.  Reform  of Monetary  Control  Istrumnts
a.  Incremental  10% cash reserve rado was eliminated  and liquidity
rado was reduced.  X
b.  RBI introduced  364 day  T-bill auctions.  x
rV.  Restmcturinz  or Privadzation  of Financial  Institutions
a.  Banks are  allowed  to  raise private  equity from capital  markets while
majority  ownership  will remnain  pubtic.  x
b.  Government  is prepared to recapitalize  banks.  1993/94  budget includes  an
estimate of necessary  funds.59
The  Phiflippines  - Financial  Sector  Refonns
1980  1931  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1981  1939  1990
1.  Dereauladon  of the Financial  Sector
a.  Functional  distinctions  between  different  financial  institutions
were  removed.  Commercial  banks  were  allowed  to operate  as universal
banks.  X
b.  Ceilings  on long-term  deposit  rates  were  removed.  X
c.  Ceilings  on long-term  loan  rates  were removed.  X
d.  Ceilings  on short-tem  deposit  rates  were removed.  X
e.  Ceilings  on short-term  loan  rates  were removed.  X
II.  Strenarhening  of Regulatory.  Supervisory  and Lemal  Systems
a.  Refonn  of the legal  framework  and bankruptcy  laws  and
strengthening  prudendal  regulations  and their  enforcement.  X
ID.  Reform  of Monetan  Control  Instruments
a.  Attempt  to give  primacy  to T-bills  in monetary  operadons.  X
b.  Reserve  requirements  were  reduced.  X
c.  Rediscount  rate  adjusted  in line  with  market  rates.  X
d.  Access  to rediscounts  were  rationalized.  X
e.  New  liquidity  window  opened  for  'nonnal  needs.  X
f.  New  central  bank  bills  were  issued.  X
g.  There  was  a shift  to base  money  as intermediate  target.  X
IV.  Restructuring  or Privatizadon  of Financial  Insdtutions
a.  Numberof  rinancial  insdtutions  fell from 1216  in 1981  to 1025  in
1986  due to the 1981-86  financial  crisis  and subsequent  restructuring,
merger,  and failures.  X  X  X  X  X  X
b.  The  share  or public  banks  in total  banking  assets  was  reduced  from  28%
to  1.4%  in IM.  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X60
Korea - Financial Sector Reforms
1930  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  19S8  1989  1991
1.  Deregulation  of the Financial  Sector
a.  Transactions  in bonds and repos were formalized.  X
b.  Restrictions  an scope of activities were eased.  X  X  X
c.  New entry of insdtutions  was allowed.  X
d.  Deposit  rates were partially  liberalized  to establish positive
real rates.  X
e.  Credit ceilings abolished.  X
f.  Preferendal Interest  rates abolished.  X
g.  Mintma  interest rate ranges were introduced.  X
h.  Indirect  portfolio investment  by foreigners  was allowed.  X  X  X  X  X
i.  Most bank lending rates were completely  deregulated.  X
j.  Government  announced  a plan to completely  deregulate  money market
and deposit rates by 1997.  X
I.  Strenitheningn  ofRegulatory. Supervisory  and Leual Systems
a.  Supervisory  procedures  reformed and focus strengthened.  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
b.  Over the counter market established  for small and medium firms.  X
c.  Capital  market laws were rmvised.  x
111.  Reform of Monetary  Control Instruments
a.  Reserve requirements  were lowered  and unified.  X
b.  Reliance  on directed credit was reduced.  X  x  x  x  x  x  x
IV.  Restructuring  or Privatization  of Financial  Institutions
a.  Public  banks were privatized.  X  X
b.  Bank  debts were resheduled.  X  X  X  X  X  X61
Chile - FinacIa  Sector Reforms
1974  1975  1976  1977  1975  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  19S4  198S  1986
1.  Demevulaion  of the Financial  Sector
a.  Short-term  money market rates  were freed.  X
b.  Barriers to entry were lowered.  X
c.  Quantitative  credit controls were removed.  X
d.  Interest rates  were liberalized.  X
e.  Restricdons  on scope  of activides  were eased.
f.  Foreign  bank entry was allowed.
g.  Commercial  banks were allowed to bormw abroad.  X  X
I.  Strengtheninx  of Regulatory.  Sunervisorv  and  Legal  Systems
a.  Limits were Imposed  on bank lending  to interrelated  entities.  X
b.  Loan classificadon  and provisioning  rules were established.  X
c.  Measures  to $ghten  bank supervision  were approved.  X
d.  A banking  law further strengthened  prudendal  supervision.  X
al.  Reform  of Monetary  Contrul Instruments
a.  Auctions  of central bank credit and t-bills Introduced.  X
b.  Reserve  requirements  were lowered and unified.  X
IV.  Restructurinz  or Privatization  of Finanial  Institutionj
a.  Commercial  banks were privatized.  X  X  X
b.  Pension finds were privauized.  x
c.  1981-83  rm  ncial  crisis started  with a run on a major
bank. Authorides  had to intervene  and took over 8 institutions.  X
d.  Government  took over 8 more institutions.  x
e.  Banks  were re-privatized.  x62
Ghan - Fancal  Sector  Reforms
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
1.  Deregulation  of the Financial  Sector
a.  LAnding  rates  were partially  liberalized.  X
b.  Interest  rates  were  completely  liberlized.  Y
c.  Govenunent  controls  ovet bank  fees  and charges  were
elimninated.  X
d.  Sectorl credit  allocation  tuaets were  phased  OUL 
e. Banr specific  credit  cuilins were  abolished.  x
f.  New  entry  was  allowed.  x
g.  Ohana  stock  exchange  began  operaig.  X
a.  Strengthening  of Regulatorv.  Suervisorv  and LaIml  Systems
a.  Banking  law was  amended  to establish  prudential  lending  Umlts  and
capital  adequacy  requirements.  Uniform  accoundng  and auditing
sandards  were  also  instituted.  X  X  X
mi.  Reform  of Monetary  Conrol Instruments
a.  A T-bill  auction  was  intrduced.  X
IV.  Restructurinn  or Privatinzation  of Financia  Institudons
a.  Govemment  re-stsuctured  banks.
b.  Government  announced  plans  to privatize  banks  in 1993.63
Senegal - Financal Sector Reforms
1989  1990
1.  Deregulation  of the Financial  Sector
a.  Directed  credits were reduced.  X
11.  Strenadhenine  of Reculatory.  Sunervisory  and Leual SYsems
a.  Bank  capital requirements  were increased  and prudential  reguladons were
strengthened.  x
b.  Bank  supervision  was improved.  X
m.  Refoin of Monetary  Control Instrumen!s
IV.  Restructarinz  or Privatizadon  of Financial  Instiudons
a.  Banks  wore restructured.  Somc institations  were closed.  X
b.  Government  ownership in each bank was reduced to less than 25%.  X  XPolicy Rsse.rch Working Paper Series
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